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Advancing Rationality with 
Sustainability 
An Analysis of Agent-Based Simulation
osman Goktug Tanrikulu
Portland State University
Today, falling trends of species and ecosystem in the world due to 
overconsumption and destruction of natural resources are at critical 
levels. It is vital for humanity to operate with sustainable and resilient 
modes of production and consumption. In this regard, this paper 
examines the basic premise of rationality and introduces sustainability as 
an advancement to the theoretical concept of rationality. Thus, a rational 
mindset and a sustainable mindset are compared under depletion of 
environmental resources. The understanding of rationality in the analysis 
is based on Garett Hardin’s (1968) ‘the tragedy of the commons’ model, 
in which actors are self-interested and individualistic while seeking 
resources. Conversely, a sustainable mindset acknowledges environmental 
limitations and takes action accordingly. By utilizing agent-based 
modeling, both rational and sustainable mindsets are modeled, and their 
relative behavior are put into action in computer simulation. The results 
reveal that the basic understanding of rationality is not always going 
to maximize the utility of agents. Instead, there may be environmental 
conditions where having a sustainable mindset generates more wealth. 
In a scenario of resource depletion, the chances of survival decrease for 
rational agents. Their situation is exacerbated if their level of greed 
increases. However, the sustainable agents continue making stable wealth 
even with limited environmental resources. Rational actors must develop 
a sustainable mindset in order to acclimatize themselves to environmental 
deterioration.  
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
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introduction
one of the most alarming global challenges faced today is environmental damage and destruction all across the world due to human 
overconsumption and exploitation of natural resources. ecosystems and 
biodiversity including animal species are increasingly affected by pressures 
from unsustainable agriculture, fisheries, mining and other human activities 
that contribute to habitat loss, degradation, overexploitation, climate change 
and pollution. for example, between 1970 and 2013, the population of the 
world’s wild animals decreased 58 percent.1 according to the ecological 
footprint assessments, a measure of the relationship between human behavior 
and the earth’s resource capacity, the regenerative capacity of the earth is 
not sufficient to accommodate the current human demand. currently, the 
capacity of at least 1.6 planet earths is needed to meet the goods and services 
of human consumption each year.2 in this day and age, “the global population 
is cutting down trees faster than they regrow, catching fish faster than the 
oceans can restock, pumping water from rivers and aquifers faster than rainfall 
can replenish them and emitting more climate-warming carbon dioxide than 
oceans and forests can absorb.”3  The overconsumption of earth’s renewable 
resources threatens the environmental systems and the future of humanity.  
current economic systems, governance practices, as well as the social 
values of consumerist societies are driving humanity to an unsustainable 
future. “structural elements of these systems such as the use of gross domestic 
product (GdP) as a measure of well-being, the pursuit of infinite economic 
growth on a finite planet, the prevalence of short-term gain over long-term 
continuity in many business and political models, and the externalization 
of ecological and social costs in the current economic system encourage 
unsustainable choices by individuals, businesses and governments.”4 
however, protecting the planet’s natural capital and its ecosystem is in 
people’s primary interest. with a weak or destroyed natural environment, 
it will not be possible for humanity to create a fair and a prosperous future, 
conquer poverty and improve health. significant changes must take place 
within the global economic system in order to inculcate a vision that the 
earth has limited resources. research advocates “changing the way we 
measure success, managing natural resources sustainably, and taking future 
generations and the value of nature into account in decision-making.”5 it is 
critical for humanity to operate within sustainable limits of production and 
consumption. To prevent further degradation of the environment a mindset 
must be developed that comprehends resource boundaries and promotes a 
sustainable way of life for the future. 
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This paper explores the consequences of environmental factors in 
decision-making modeling. The purpose is to demonstrate how different 
ways of thinking become important under scarce resources. by utilizing 
agent-based modeling and an artificial behavioral space, the performances of 
rational and sustainable mindsets are compared under various environmental 
conditions. variations in behavior are tested in a simulation environment in 
which different factors can be manipulated and experimented. The agent-
based models that are designed in this study use the simulation software 
netlogo 6.0.6 overall, the findings suggest that agents who acknowledge 
the limitations of environmental resources and act accordingly benefit over 
agents who are self-interested and individualistic. 
Theoretical framework
rationality is the leading concept of most decision-making models. 
classic economic theory, modern decision theory and game theory all utilize 
the concept of rationality. according to sidney verba, a rational actor makes 
a “cool and clearheaded ends-means calculation” after considering all possible 
courses of action and attentively weighing the advantages and disadvantages of 
each of them.7 Modern formal decision theory and game theory suggest that 
optimal choices arise out of compelling and systematically defined situations. 
in these situations, rationality alludes to consistent utility-maximizing 
computation or adjustment to specific impediments. from the perspective of 
economics, a rational actor would select the most efficient alternative, which 
maximizes output compared to input, or minimizes input considering output. 
for instance, among different goods, a rational consumer chooses the one 
that will create maximum usefulness or advantages with the lowest cost. in 
modern decision theory, rational decision-making is about choosing among 
certain alternatives with each one having a particular set of consequences. 
The agent ranks each of the consequences in terms of its benefits and chooses 
the preferred alternative. if the consequences are unclear, the decision maker 
chooses an alternative that has the greatest utility expected. Game theory 
applies the same logic of utility maximization but additionally emphasizes 
how one actor’s best choice can be dependent on another’s.8 
while many theories in different academic disciplines use the concept 
of rationality, there is hardly any consensus on the specifications of the 
concept. There are various perceptions and conceptualizations of rationality 
emphasizing distinct dimensions and thus various methodological tools to 
attain it. for instance, procedural rationality identifies the concept with 
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“omniscience.”9 it is assumed that an actor knows the consequences of all his 
actions precisely, and he has clearly defined preferences. Procedural rationality 
also assumes that an actor correctly judges the preferences of other relevant 
actors and their possible response to his strategic choices. according to this 
view, rationality excludes misconceptions or flaws of human cognition, and 
omits emotional or psychological shortcomings.10 on the other hand, those 
who define rationality instrumentally, provide a more limited view of the 
concept. according to instrumental rationality, a rational actor will choose 
the option that produces the more preferred result when faced with two 
alternatives. instrumental rationality relies on two assumptions: connectivity 
and transitivity. connectivity implies that an actor has the ability to compare 
achievable outcomes and logically evaluate them. Transitivity means that 
if a player chooses option a to b, and b to c, then he will choose a to c. 
assumptions of instrumental rationality are useful for constructing theories 
of rational or psychological choice.11 
contrary to the classic economic perspective of rationality, herbert 
simon proposes bounded rationality highlighting the limitations of 
individuals’ decision-making. simon outlines the assumptions of traditional 
economic theory concerning a rational economic agent as the use of complete 
information, having a well-organized and a stable preference system and the 
ability to calculate utility for every alternative. however, according to simon, 
individuals do not seek to maximize their interests through a specific pathway. 
he points out that individuals do not have access to all the information 
needed. besides, even if they had full access, their cognitive capacity and time 
availability are not going to let them digest and process all that information. 
Therefore, simon suggests approximate rational behavior to account for 
actual access to information and actual computational capacities. rather than 
finding the optimal choices, decision-makers seek satisfactory solutions.12  
These different theoretical perspectives express the dynamic concept of 
rationality and the robust nature of the academic dialogue surrounding this 
concept. The concept of rationality can become even more complex when 
environmental factors are added into the picture. Garett hardin is one of the 
first scholars demonstrating how rational actors can end up in suboptimal 
outcomes in to environmental settings. hardin came up with the expression 
“the tragedy of the commons” modeling the anticipation of environmental 
degradation whenever a scarce resource is in use by many individuals 
collectively. hardin explains his model with the example of a pasture open to 
everyone. The logical structure is portrayed from the perspective of rational 
herdsmen. according to hardin’s illustration, each herder benefits from using 
the pasture. being rational, it is expected that each herdsman will try to have 
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as many cattle as possible on the pasture to maximize their gain. herdsmen 
question the utility that is going to be gained as a result of adding one more 
animal to their herd. The positive side is all the earnings from the additional 
animal; thus the +1 utility. in contrast, the negative side is overgrazing due 
to adding one more animal. rather than bearing the full negative utility 
individually, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen. hence, 
the negative utility for each herdsman is a portion of -1. because negative utility 
is distributed equitably among the herdsmen rather than being experienced 
individually, each and every rational herdsman sharing this commons would 
have this same decision-making calculus – adding more and more animals 
to their herds. as a result, the “tragedy” occurs.13 “each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is 
limited.”14 when each man pursues his own interest on a commons without 
regard for others,  destruction ensues and eventually brings downfall to all.15 
hardin’s model is important in terms of portraying the dichotomy between 
overconsumption and scarce resources. 
scholar richard campbell also drew attention to rationality’s theoretical 
paradox. The prisoner’s dilemma game reveals how rational individual 
strategies can lead to collectively irrational results. according to the game, 
two men, a and b, are held separately by the police charged with a joint 
crime. The prosecutor offers a deal to the prisoners who are in separate cells 
and unable to communicate with each other. each prisoner is told that even 
if they don’t confess, there is enough evidence to incarcerate them for a year. 
if one confesses and the other does not, the former will go free but and his 
silent accomplice will be sentenced for ten years. if both confess their crime, 
each one will be sentenced for nine years. The circumstances for the prisoners 
are summarized in Table 1. 
  
Tanrikulu: Advancing Rationality with Sustainability
2017] 11advancinG raTionaliTy wiTh susTainabiliTy 
from the perspective of prisoner a, prisoner b has two possible 
alternatives; he is either going to confess or not. either way, if a is rational, 
he would confess in order to get fewer years. if prisoner b confesses, then 
confessing will be better for a. if b does not confess, it is again better for a 
to confess – serving no jail time. The same reasoning applies to prisoner b 
as well. consequently, if both a and b are rational, they will both confess 
and end up serving nine years in jail. Therefore, the prisoner’s dilemma game 
portrays how rational human beings can achieve irrational outcomes.16
similarly, Mancur olson depicts, in The Logic of Collective Action, how 
individuals fail to pursue their joint welfare. olson challenges the general idea 
that when acting on behalf of their common interests, groups of individuals 
are expected to act for the common interests like single individuals would 
have acted for their personal interests. Previous research argued that a group 
of rational and self-interested actors would act collectively if they have a 
common interest or objective, which is going to make all of them better off. 
however, olson claims that the proposition that groups will act on their 
self-interest due to their rational and self-interested behavior is actually not 
correct.17 in fact, “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, 
or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals 
act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act 
to achieve their common or group interests.”18 consequently, when members 
of a large group try to maximize their personal welfare rationally, they will 
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not act to promote their common or group objectives unless there are other 
factors such as coercion. 
olson points out the role of organizations as a means to attain common 
or group interests.  organizations can execute a function when there are 
common or group interests – sharing a single purpose or objective. even 
though organizations frequently attend to personal interests, their essential 
quality and core function is to further the common interests of groups of 
individuals. individual, unorganized action won’t be able to further that 
common interest, or it won’t be able to further it sufficiently.19 
elinor ostrom brought a new perspective to the tragedy of the commons, 
the prisoner’s dilemma and the logic of collective action, which all depict how 
rational individuals can create irrational outcomes. all of these models portray 
how people jointly use a resource in a natural setting and how individuals jointly 
produce a suboptimal result. ostrom advanced scholarship on rationality by 
applying methodological individualism to comprehend cooperative behavior 
and institutions.20 she brought a new collective action dimension to hardin’s 
argument in “The Tragedy of the commons” notwithstanding rational choice 
individualism.21 ostrom argues that through institutions in which there is 
shared behavior and egotistical individualism is regulated, commons can 
be governed. in order to prevent the destruction of natural resources, some 
scholars have historically recommended state control and some suggested the 
privatization of those resources. however, ostrom asserts that “neither the 
state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain 
long-term, productive use of natural systems.”22 instead, communities of 
individuals constructed institutions, dissimilar to the state or to the market, 
to manage resource systems with certain level of success over time.23 
rational and egotistical individual actions in pursuit of maximizing 
self-interest can be regulated under institutions as the shared decisions and 
behaviors.24 This perspective sees institutions as rules, norms and designed 
constraints, which organize social, political, and economic interactions.25 
according to ostrom, rules are important in terms of decreasing the 
uncertainty that is caused by the unpredictable behavior of individuals and 
resource systems:
In all cases in which individuals have organized themselves to solve CPR 
[common-pool resource, such as inshore fisheries, communal forests, smaller 
grazing areas, groundwater basins, and irrigation systems] problems, rules have 
been established by the appropriators that have severely constrained the authorized 
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actions available to them. Such rules specify, for example, how many resource units 
an individual can appropriate, when, where and how they can be appropriated, 
and the amounts of labor, materials, or money that must be contributed to various 
provisioning activities. If everyone, or almost everyone, follows these rules, resource 
units will be allocated more predictably and efficiently, conflict levels will be reduced, 
and the resource system itself will be sustained over time.26
ostrom’s core argument is that individuals are more likely to generate 
and preserve the commons when they have feasible and dependable 
information, which is crucial in terms of working out the costs and benefits 
of resource decisions, and when they have opportunities to set the rules of 
the scheme.27 Thus, ostrom theorizes on self-organizing and self-governing 
forms of collective action. unlike hardin28, ostrom argues the tragedy of 
the commons is not the inevitable result for every resource. The outcome 
of resources depends “on the existence of institutions governing access, 
utilization, management, exclusion, ownership and transfer of ownership.”29 
consequently, despite the popularity of individualistic economic thinking, 
ostrom proposed a vision of cooperative behavior which does not depend on 
a centralized state.   
Modeling
agent-based models are composed of agents that interact within 
an environment. agents can be independent computer programs or 
separate parts of a program representing social actors, such as individuals, 
organizations, firms, or nation-states. agents are programmed to respond to 
the computational environment, which is to simulate the behavior of social 
actors in real environment. agent-based simulation offers the possibility to 
represent people’s decision rules.30 in agent-based modeling terminology, 
decision rules are the algorithms of the agents that let their interaction with 
each other and with the environment. The way people think or their logic is 
reflected in agent-based modeling as decision rules. as a mean to simulate the 
behavior of social actors in a real environment, the decision rules should be 
explicitly defined in the models.     
in this study, the agents’ decision rules rely on two assumptions. The 
first assumption applies rationality on resource utilization based on the 
calculations of actors in Garett hardin’s the tragedy of the commons model.31 
according to this model, rational actors would not hesitate to consume the 
resources of the commons for their individual interests. Therefore, when 
rationality is the primary driver of an actor, it is expected that this person 
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would utilize the resources in its environment to increase its wealth as much 
as possible. it is difficult to portray an abstract concept like rationality in a 
concrete way, especially in an artificial environment. Therefore, ‘generating 
wealth via resource usage’ is employed as a basic indication of one’s rational 
mindset:   
The higher the level of rationality of an actor, the more it will obtain the resources 
in the environment to maximize its utility. The lower the rationality of an actor, the 
less it will extract the resources around to maximize its wealth. 
The second assumption points out a particular mindset that can be 
presented as an additional dimension to the basic notion of rationality. The 
purpose is to identify a mindset that is going to advance rationality’s self-
interest seeking individualistic premise.   
Thus, this analysis takes ‘sustainable mindset’ as a factor that can be tested 
against the first assumption. People with a sustainable mindset are aware of 
environmental trends including diminished biodiversity and degradation of 
ecosystems in the world. hence, they choose a way of life that avoids the 
overuse of resources. in other words, people with sustainable mindsets limit 
their resource consumptions according to earth’s environmental capacity. 
The more the sustainable an actor is, the more it will restrain from conserving 
resources to maximize its utility in the long-term. The less the sustainable an actor is, 
the more it will disregard conserving the natural resources for the sake of maximizing 
its immediate interests.    
The analysis in this study focuses only on the aspects of the rational 
and sustainable mindsets addressed in the assumptions. rationality 
and sustainability are abstract concepts with many different layers and 
facets. however, to run an experiment on these mindsets and observe the 
consequences, certain aspects of these systems have to be isolated. agent-
based modeling and virtual simulations help us peel off the layers of these 
mindsets and overcome difficulties of isolating abstract human systems. 
Thus, agent-based modeling is utilized as a computational method to test the 
behavioral consequences of the rational and the sustainable mindsets.  
     
The basic connection of the rational and the sustainable mindset with 
resource extraction is simulated in netlogo through various models. The 
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analysis avails several models as a means to capture the behavioral pattern 
of rationality in realistic terms. starting from the most basic and ending 
with the most advanced, the models will be presented one by one to explain 
how different dimensions of rationality are addressed. The models used in 
this study utilized the codes of sugarscape and wealth distribution models, 
which can be reached from the Models library of netlogo.32 
Model development & Testing
Model development and testing of this study is conducted hand in hand. 
The core behavioral principles are tested on various models. Testing procedure 
is applied not only in terms of portraying the intended behavior in the best 
way, but also in terms of introducing new variables to make the model as 
similar as possible to real-life scenarios. 
The analysis starts with the basic rationality Model, which is depicted in 
figure 1. The netlogo codes of all the models in this study can be found in 
appendix i to replicate and trace. The left-hand side picture is a screenshot 
of the simulation before it was launched. The simulation begins with random 
distribution of resources and agents. The left picture in figure 1 shows the 
randomly created red agents and the green resource mountains in the artificial 
simulation environment. The most basic variable that is used in the model is 
‘rationality’. every agent is created with a random score of rationality from 1 
to 10. The behavioral rule of the agents is to go to the resource mountains and 
to extract resources according to their levels of rationality: 
The higher the level of rationality of an agent (turtle), the more it will extract 
from the green resource mountains (patches).
for instance, when all the other variables are held constant, an agent with 
a rationality score 8 extracts resources faster than a level 4 agent. The resources 
that are extracted by the agents become their wealth to keep. for example, an 
agent with a rationality score 2 accumulates wealth slower than an agent with 
a score of 6 (assuming all the other variables in the model are held constant). 
Therefore, it is expected that agents with higher level of rationality would 
extract more resources and in return accumulate more wealth. 
once the simulation is set into motion, the agents start generating wealth 
depending on their level of rationality. it is expected that the agents with 
higher levels of rationality collect wealth faster than the ones with lower 
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levels. after running the model for some time, the simulation generates 
three agent types in terms of their level of wealth as it can be seen from the 
right-hand side picture of figure 1. The red agents represent the lowest level 
of wealth generated, and then the green agents represent medium level of 
wealth. lastly, the highest wealth level compared to the wealth generated by 
the other agents is represented with blue agents. figure 2 depicts samples, 
one from each of these agent types. for instance, the left-hand side picture 
provides information for turtle 67, which is the blue agent in the center of 
the left-hand side display. when compared with the information of turtle 
171 and turtle 168, turtle 67 has generated much more wealth. Turtle 67’s 
level of rationality is 9, which is followed by turtle 168 with a rationality score 
8 and turtle 171 with level of rationality 4. Therefore, there is a relationship 
between the agents’ level of rationality and the amount of wealth that they 
generated.  
however, random factors are also included into the modeling that would 
prevent the relationship between rationality and wealth generation to be 
absolute. besides the level of rationality, the agents have random levels of 
vision and metabolism. The vision defines how many grids away an agent can 
see in the virtual environment. Therefore, agents with a higher level of vision 
have a higher chance to locate resource rich spots. additionally, agents have 
random metabolism levels. at every move, agents have to burn some level 
of wealth. agents with higher level of metabolism are burning more wealth 
compared to the others. Therefore, the lower the level of metabolism, the 
higher the probability to survive and to accumulate wealth. furthermore, 
the location where the agent is created at the beginning of the simulation 
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is crucial. as it is mentioned earlier, when the model is set up, the agents 
are randomly distributed on the simulation environment. some of them are 
created on the resource mountains or close to them, but some of the agents 
fall far away from the resources. The agents that are created away from the 
resources are going to be disadvantaged, and they are less likely to surpass the 
wealth levels of the ones that were created on the resources.  Thus, vision, 
metabolism, and location represent random factors that can influence the 
basic functioning principle of the model. as a result, due to these random 
factors, not all agents with high levels of rationality will be able to collect 
relatively high levels of wealth. similarly, because of these random factors, 
some of the agents with low levels of rationality will be able to collect more 
wealth than expected.   
by adding new variables and behavioral patterns the representation of 
the models are strengthened. The second model in the analysis introduces 
one more breed of agents – in the Two breed Model. The basic rationality 
Model portrayed the fundamental logic of rationality. however, this 
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foundational model needs to be developed with new variables and concepts. 
Therefore, in addition to the rational mindset, the Two breed Model depicts 
the sustainable mentality. by making additions to the basic model the core 
functioning principle of the model is being tested as well. because when 
new variables or behavior patterns are introduced in the model, the core 
mechanism and functioning principle should be able to accommodate this 
situation. furthermore, testing and model development increase the capacity 
of the model to capture real phenomena. 
in the Two breed Model, rationality scale is divided into two. agents that 
are randomly scored from 1 to 5 are called sustainables; on the other hand, 
agents that have rationality scores between 6 to 10 are called rationals. The 
rationality scores of rationals are higher than sustainables to reflect their desire 
to extract resources for the sake of their immediate interests. The rationality 
score of sustainables is lower to depict how they curb their consumption to 
maximize long-term gains. sustainables are represented by green and rationals 
are represented by red color. 
as it can be seen from figure 3, by utilizing the sliders on the left-
hand side of the simulation screen, certain parameters in the model can be 
manipulated. for example, the first two sliders, which are initial-sustainables 
and initial-rationals, are designed to control the population of the agents. 
additionally, agents’ movement can be manipulated via the sliders rationals-
move and sustainables-move. The sliders related to movement are useful in 
terms of comparing the activity and the mobility levels of different breeds. 
furthermore, the resource quantity can be manipulated through percent-
best-land and num-resource-grown. More specifically, percent-best-land 
slider is for changing the resource richness in the environment – the higher 
the percent-best-land, the more abundant the resources in the simulation 
environment. on the other hand, num-resource-grown operates the growth 
or regeneration level of the resources after being consumed by the agents – the 
lower the num-resource-grown, the more time it takes to restore the resources 
in the simulation environment. The plot view shows the mean wealth of the 
breeds. underneath the plot screen there are two monitors displaying the 
mean calculations of sustainables and rationals. 
Model controls are critical to simulating real life phenomena. for 
example, take a communal forest and woodsmen who make living from 
this natural resource. The woodsmen in this environment are composed of 
individuals with rational or sustainable mindsets each to varying degrees. 
The woodsmen population can be controlled through the sliders of initial-
sustainables and initial-rationals (figure 3). Their activity in the forest can 
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be managed by the sliders of rationals-move and sustainables-move. forest 
vegetation density can be manipulated by percent-best-land. The regrowth 
rate of the forest after being cut down can be controlled by num-resource-
grown. These controls can be applied to other common-pooled resources like 
fisheries, grazing lands, irrigation systems or groundwater basins.   
The Two breed Model clearly demonstrates the wealth difference between 
sustainables and rationals. with the assumption of constant grow-back in 
resources, the rational agents accumulate more resources than sustainable 
agents – the more the simulation is run, the more the wealth gap opens 
between the two breeds. even if the movement frequency of rationals is 
decreased and sustainables’ increased, rational agents generate more wealth 
due to their will to extract resources faster (assuming the resource level is 
constant). The mean wealth of sustainables can catch rationals’ (figure 4) 
only when the movement of sustainables is increased to above 90% levels and 
movement of rationals is stopped (only extracting resources from where they 
are), and the resource growback level (num-resource-grown) is minimized to 
level 1. in other words, the wealth gap between the two breeds can only be 
closed if rationals stop seeking out resources and only extract from where they 
are while sustainables increase their activity level to find resources.  
        
Model development and testing continues with introducing new 
behavioral patterns. after presenting the second breed, further experimentation 
was conducted to reflect behavioral patterns of people or societies. in the 
third model, which is named as the scanning and localizing Model, rational 
agents are constantly looking for resources to extract; therefore, they have 
a behavioral rule to constantly scan the environment. on the other hand, 
sustainable agents have a behavioral rule to turn towards the closest resource 
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mountain and continue extracting around that mountain throughout 
their life cycles without seeking other resources. as it can be seen from 
figure 5, while rationals are scattered around the environment looking for 
resources, sustainables are extracting locally; green groups are on the resource 
mountains while red agents are scattered around the environment. The graph 
that calculates means tells us that with these behavior patterns, sustainables’ 
wealth generation capacity increases—the mean wealth of sustainables is 
running close to the mean wealth of rationals compared to the mean gap in 
the Two breed Model.     
in this behavioral model, the amount of resources in the environment 
defines the winners and the losers. as figure 5 displays, current percent-best-
land of the model is 5%. what if the percent-best-land is decreased below 
5%? figure 6 demonstrates what would happen to these agents in a scenario 
of decreasing resources. The agents that are satisfied with the resources of a 
certain region generate more wealth compared to the agents that constantly 
look for resources to extract.  
one more behavior type can be tested in this model. as it can be seen 
from figure 5, the slider named ‘value’ was adjusted as 0 in the previous 
test. This slider inserts a variable to the simulation, which is designed to 
demonstrate the wealth generation effect when agents sacrifice from their 
wealth towards the resource. The purpose of this variable is to represent people 
who would invest or sacrifice from their wealth towards the activity that makes 
their living. for instance, the income generating capacity of a farmer who 
spends some of his annual income towards maintaining the fertility of his 
land can be demonstrated in this model. The ‘value’ variable becomes active 
when it is plugged in to the extract code of the model.33 This variable is only 
applied to sustainables because this behavior pattern was thought to be more 
prevalent among people who make their livings by environmental means, 
such as farming or fishing. when the ‘value’ variable starts functioning, 
sustainable agents start sacrificing some of the resources that they extract 
from the environment back to its origin rather than transforming it into 
personal wealth. for example, if the ‘value’ slider is adjusted to 50%, then 
the sustainable agents will start extracting only with half of their extracting 
capacity. a sustainable with a rationality score 4 will start extracting level 2 
instead of a 4, leaving half of what it can extract at the resource.      
when experimented with the ‘value’ variable, the first impact was a clear 
fall in the overall wealth generated by sustainables. however, this behavioral 
pattern proved to be important when resource-growth-interval and percent-
best-land is very low. in such a scenario, the sacrificing behavior of sustainables 
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keeps this breed alive longer than rationals. in other words, when there are 
scarce resources, due to the sacrificing behavior, sustainables survive longer 
than rationals. 
The final variable that will be presented in the analysis is called ‘greed’. 
in this version of the model, a new behavioral pattern related to the rational 
agents will be tested. as it was mentioned earlier, rationals already have higher 
levels of rationality scores in the models to reflect their higher desire to extract 
resources for the sake of maximizing their immediate interests. however, 
what would happen if we could manipulate the expectation level of rationals? 
This is actually possible with a small twist in the code. in this version of the 
model both breeds have a simple but very efficient rule to calculate and locate 
the best resource amount around them. The code group that lets the agents 
behave with this rule is called ‘turn-toward-resource’. every agent looks to 
four directions (north, east, south, and west) and makes a simple calculation 
comparing all the resource levels in those directions - including the spot that 
each one is standing at - and gives a decision to move or not to move towards 
the best resource. by inserting a variable in the turn-toward-resource code of 
rationals, it is possible to define the minimum resource units that these agents 
are looking for. in other words, the higher the level of greed, the higher the 
resource level that rationals will be looking for. The maximum resource level 
(max-resource) in one patch is adjusted in the code as 50. when the greed 
level is increased over 50 (higher than the maximum resource level set in the 
model), we observe a scanning behavior from the rationals – not stopping on 
any resource mountain but constantly scanning the environment. because no 
resource mountain is satisfactory for them to stop by; they just extract from 
the resources on their ways. however, the more we decrease the level of greed, 
the more we observe rational agents settling down in resource mountains. 
This behavior pattern with greed directly influences the resource extraction 
and wealth generation of rationals. it is observed that some level of greed 
helps rational agents to generate wealth efficiently; however, when a certain 
threshold of greed is passed, rational agents lose their resource extraction 
efficiency. as it can be seen from figure 7, when greed level is adjusted to 30, 
rationals’ resource generation competence falls behind sustainables’ wealth 
generation capability.       
The Greed Model is tested in behaviorspace to understand the influence 
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of greed with other factors. The following parameters are inserted to 





num-resource-grown: 1, 5, 10
greed: 1, 50, 100
percent-best-land: 1, 3, 5
resource-growth-interval: 1, 5, 10
To test the combination of all these parameters, behaviorspace runs 
slightly more than 800 simulations. The analysis output is presented in Table 
2, Graph 1, Graph 2, and Graph 3. The results display the percent-best-land 
level of 1 under the categories of greed 1, 50, and 100. in Table 2, rows 
show three different levels of resource-growth-interval under the categories of 
greed. The columns exhibit number-resource-grown. 
every greed category on Table 2 is separately illustrated in the following 
graphs. additionally, in the appendix section, the greed categories are 
presented under the percent-best-land levels of 3 and 5 for further information. 
The data parameters are all embedded in the graphs. as demonstrated in 
Graph 1, there are three variables laid out in the x-axis. The very top layer 
indicates the number of resources grown, which depicts the levels of 1, 5 and 
10. in the middle layer, resource growth interval is shown. The bottom layer 
is percent best land. for instance, Graph 1 tells us that when greed level is 1 
and percent-best-land level is 1, sustainables end up with slightly more wealth 
except in conditions where number-of-resource-grown is very low.
The results of the behaviorspace experiments that are exhibited through 
Graph 1 and Graph 3, and through Graph 1a and Graph 3b in the appendix 
section demonstrate that greed and percent-best-land are critical factors 
affecting the wealth generation capacity of the agents. according to the 
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graphical demonstrations, rational agents manage to generate more wealth 
in resource abundant scenarios. however, when the greed level of rational 
actors is increased to 50, which is depicted in Graphs 2, 2a and 2b, the wealth 
generating capability of rational actors falter. unless percent-best-land is very 
high (level 5), sustainable agents generate more wealth than rational actors 
when the greed level is set to 50.
similarly, when the greed level is increased to 100, rational agents lose 
their wealth generating capacities even further (Graphs 3, 3a, and 3b). 
even in resource rich scenarios (percent-best-land=5), if the greed level is 
at high levels, sustainable agents generate more wealth than rational agents. 
compared to the other variables, resource-growth-interval is a weak factor 
with regard to comparing the two mindsets. consequently, the higher the 
level of greed, the lower the agents’ capacity to generate wealth. 
The behaviorspace experiment results, portrayed through Graph 1 and 
Graph 3, and Graph 1-a through Graph 3-b tell us that when agents only 
seek to maximize self-interest and act individualistic, they actually end up 
being worse off. There might be environmental conditions where instead 
of being rational, having a sustainable mindset (being concerned about the 
nature and resource depletion) will be more helpful to agents in terms of 
generating wealth. in order to compare the performance of the two mindsets, 
the behaviorspace experiment data can be arranged in a way to represent an 
environmental degradation setting.  
let’s assume a scenario of resource depletion in the world. it is the year 
around 2117. due to climate change and pollution, there is little clean 
water, air and soil resources. degradation of environment and destruction of 
ecosystem have limited the agricultural output in the world. as a result, in such 
a scenario, people would face scarce resources - environmental limitations. The 
behaviorspace test results are presented from high percent-best-land towards 
lower percentages to create the impact of these environmental conditions. 
The experimental data helps us understand the survival capacity of the agents 
with rational mindset compared to the ones with sustainable mindset. 
Graph 4 compares the wealth levels of rationals and sustainables under 
depleting resources. The x-axis displays three layers of variables: the first layer 
is number- resources-grown; the middle layer is percent-best-land; and there 
is greed at the bottom. from the left towards the right-hand side of the graph, 
number-resources-grown and percent-best-land decreases. in the left portion 
of the graph, under greed level 1, rationals gather more wealth when the 
resources are rich (number-resource-grown=10, percent-best-land=5 or 3). 
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when the number-resource-grown falls to 5, sustainables always generate 
more resources. however, both rationals’ and sustainables’ wealth drop 
significantly when number-resource-grown falls to 1. in the middle portion 
of Graph 4, which presents the results under the greed level 50, the overall 
wealth generation capability of rationals decrease compared to level 1 greed. 
under the greed level 100, rationals lose their wealth generation capability 
even further. rising expectations too much in terms of resource extraction 
turns out to be a negative trait for wealth generation. in the most extreme 
resource depletion case, where both number-resource-grown and percent-
best-land are at level 1, rationals accumulate slightly more wealth compared 
to sustainables; however, both breeds can accumulate only little wealth that 
they are equally on the verge of perishing.      
The experimentation data indicate that in a resource depletion scenario, 
the rational mindset does not always bring the highest level of utility. 
Graph 4 presents 27 different environmental and behavioral combinations 
to enact different cases. The rational mindset generates more wealth only 
in 12 of these cases. on the other hand, the sustainable mindset produces 
more wealth in 15 of these cases. on the left-hand side of the graph, it is 
observed that rational agents obtain high yields when there are abundant 
resources. however, once the resources start to deplete, sustainable agents 
begin surpassing rational agents in terms of wealth. on the right-hand side 
of the graph where the greed level is the highest, sustainable agents increase 
the wealth gap with rational agents. The sustainable mindset generates steady 
wealth throughout the cases compared to the rational mindset. The wealth 
generation capability of the rational agents become unstable due to greed and 
environmental conditions. all in all, in a scenario of resource depletion, the 
likelihood of survival decreases for rational agents when their level of greed 
increases.  
conclusion
This paper tested the basic understanding of rationality in a simulation 
environment by utilizing agent-based modeling and introduced sustainability 
as an advancement. 
rationality is considered as the central pillar of decision-making models, 
and at the same time rationality has been defined in different ways throughout 
the literature. Through simulation modeling, this study isolated specific 
elements of this complex concept and explored basic notions of rationality. 
The rational mindset, based on hardin’s tragedy of the commons model 
portraying the individualistic and self-interest seeking behavior, is compared 
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with sustainable mindset. The sustainable mindset acknowledges the 
limitations of environmental resources and act accordingly. while simulation 
modeling is a methodological tool, it has the potential to design and represent 
real-life phenomenon. Thus, the results from these models are compelling 
and have potential to contribute to the understanding of rationality.
The various model results indicate that the rational mindset does 
not always guarantee maximum utility. The simulation data reveal that 
rational agents struggle generating wealth when environmental factors are 
manipulated. under the conditions of limited resources, the sustainable 
agents proved to be more resilient. when the greed factor is introduced in the 
simulation, the rational agents are further incapacitated to generate wealth. 
consequently, in a scenario of resource depletion, the chances of survival 
decrease for the rational agents, and greed ends up aggravating their resource 
extraction capability. conversely, sustainable agents are capable of generating 
steady wealth even if the environmental conditions are pressing.         
sustainability is not an alternative mindset to rationality, but a 
development to it. a rational actor adapts to environmental boundaries 
in order to minimize losses and maximize benefits. if an actor insists on 
preserving an individualistic and self-interested mindset under conditions of 
resource depletion, his wealth generation capability will be weakened and 
his survival chances will decrease. a rational actor must adopt a sustainable 
mindset when faced with environmental deterioration to increase the level of 
utility and likelihood of survival under the new conditions. 
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  ask patches
  [set max-resource-here 0
    if  ( random-float 100.0) <= percent-best-land
    [  set max-resource-here max-resource
      set resource-here max-resource-here ]]
  repeat 5
  [ ask patches with [max-resource-here != 0]
    [ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
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  diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
  repeat 10
  [ diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
  ask patches
  [ set resource-here floor resource-here
    set max-resource-here resource-here
    recolor-patch ]
end
to recolor-patch
  set pcolor scale-color green resource-here 0 max-resource
end
to setup-turtles
  set-default-shape turtles “person”
   crt num-people
   [ move-to one-of patches
    set size 1.0
    set-turtle-initial




  set age 0
  face one-of neighbors4
  set life-expectancy life-expectancy-min +
  random (life-expectancy-max - life-expectancy-min + 1)
  set metabolism 1 + random metabolism-max
  set wealth 0
  set vision 1 + random max-vision
  set rationality random-in-range 1 10
end
to recolor-turtles
  let max-wealth max [wealth] of turtles
  ask turtles
  [ ifelse (wealth <= max-wealth / 3)
  [ set color red ]
  [ ifelse (wealth <= (max-wealth * 2 / 3 ))
  [ set color green ]
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  [ set color blue ] ] ]
end
to go
  ask turtles
  [ turn-towards-resource ]
  ;;vision
  extract
  ask turtles
  [ move-age-die ]
  recolor-turtles
  if ticks mod resource-growth-interval = 0




  set heading 0
  let best-direction 0
  let best-amount resource-ahead
  set heading 90
  if ( resource-ahead > best-amount )
  [ set best-direction 90
  set best-amount resource-ahead ]
  set heading 180
  if (resource-ahead > best-amount )
  [ set best-direction 180
  set best-amount resource-ahead ]
  set heading 270
  if ( resource-ahead > best-amount)
  [ set best-direction 270
    set best-amount resource-ahead ]
  set heading best-direction
end
to-report resource-ahead
  let total 0
  let how-far 1
  repeat vision
  [ set total total + [resource-here] of patch-ahead how-far
  set how-far how-far + 1 ]
  report total
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end
to grow-resource
  if (resource-here < max-resource-here)
  [ set resource-here resource-here + num-resource-grown
  if (resource-here > max-resource-here)
  [ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
  recolor-patch ]
end
to extract
  ask turtles
  [ set wealth floor (wealth + rationality)]
  ask turtles
  [ set resource-here (resource-here - rationality)
  recolor-patch]
  ask turtles
  [ if (resource-here < rationality) [set resource-here 0]
   set wealth (wealth + resource-here)
   recolor-patch]
end
to move-age-die
  fd 1
  set wealth (wealth - metabolism)
  set age (age + 1)
  if (wealth < 0) or (age >= life-expectancy)
   [set-turtle-initial]
end
to-report random-in-range [low high]
  report low + random (high - low + 1)
end
B – The NetLogo Code for the Two Breed Model
globals [ resource max-resource min-resource ]
breed [ sustainables sustainable ] 
breed [ rationals rational ] 
turtles-own [ metabolism vision rationality wealth ]
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patches-own [ resource-here max-resource-here ]
to setup
  ca
  set max-resource 50






  ask patches
  [ set max-resource-here 0
    if ( random-float 100.0 ) <= percent-best-land
    [ set max-resource-here max-resource
      set resource-here max-resource-here ]]
  repeat 5
  [ ask patches with [ max-resource-here != 0 ]
    [ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
    diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
  repeat 10
  [ diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
  ask patches
  [ set resource-here floor resource-here
    set max-resource-here resource-here
    recolor-patch ]
end
to recolor-patch ;; wd
  set pcolor scale-color green resource-here 0 max-resource
end
to setup-turtles
  create-sustainables initial-sustainables [
  set color 65
  setxy random-xcor random-ycor
  set rationality random 4 + 1
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  ]
  create-rationals initial-rationals [
  set color red
  setxy random-xcor random-ycor




  ask rationals
  [ if (ceiling random-float 100.0)<= rationals-move [fd 1 ] ]
  ask sustainables;;
  [ if (ceiling random-float 100.0)<= sustainables-move [fd 1] ]
  extract




   ask rationals [
    ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
    [ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality )]
    [ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here ) ] recolor-patch]
  ask rationals [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
  [ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - rationality )]
  [ set resource-here 0 ] recolor-patch]
  ask sustainables [
    ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
    [ set wealth floor ( wealth + (rationality - rationality * (value 
/ 100))) ]
    [set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here )] recolor-patch ]
  ask sustainables [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
  [ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - (rationality - 
rationality * (value / 100 ))) ]
  [ set resource-here 0 ] recolor-patch]
end
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to grow-resource 
  if ( resource-here < max-resource-here )
  [ set resource-here resource-here + num-resource-grown
  if ( resource-here > max-resource-here )
  [ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
  recolor-patch ]
end
C – The NetLogo Code for the 
Scanning and Localizing Model 
globals [ resource max-resource min-resource initial-wealth ]
breed [ sustainables sustainable ] 
breed [ rationals rational ] 
turtles-own [ metabolism vision rationality wealth age max-age]
patches-own [ resource-here max-resource-here ]
to setup
  ca






   ask patches
  [ set max-resource-here 0
    if ( random-float 100.0 ) <= percent-best-land
    [ set max-resource-here max-resource
      set resource-here max-resource-here ]]
  repeat 5
  [ ask patches with [ max-resource-here != 0 ]
    [ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
    diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
  repeat 10
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  [ diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
  ask patches
  [ set resource-here floor resource-here
    set max-resource-here resource-here
    recolor-patch ]
end
to recolor-patch 
  set pcolor scale-color green resource-here 0 max-resource
end
to setup-turtles
  create-sustainables initial-sustainables
  [
    move-to one-of patches
    set color 65
    set shape “person”
    ;;setxy random-xcor random-ycor
    set-initial-turtle-vars
    set rationality random 4 + 1 ]
  create-rationals initial-rationals
  [
    move-to one-of patches
    set color red
    set shape “person”
    ;;setxy random-xcor random-ycor
    set-initial-turtle-vars
    set rationality random 5 + 5 ]
end
to set-initial-turtle-vars
  set age 0
  face one-of neighbors4
  set max-age 100
  set metabolism 1 + random 7
  set wealth metabolism
  set vision 1 + random 7
end
to go
  ask sustainables
    [ turn-toward-resource ]
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  extract
  ask sustainables
    [ move-sustainables ]
  ask rationals
    [ move-rationals ]
  ask patches [ grow-resource ]
  ;;ask turtles [ set age (age + 1) ]
  if ticks mod resource-growth-interval = 0




  set heading 0
  let best-direction 0
  let best-amount resource-ahead
  set heading 90
  if ( resource-ahead > best-amount )
    [ set best-direction 90
    set best-amount resource-ahead ]
    set heading 180
  if ( resource-ahead > best-amount )
    [ set best-direction 180
    set best-amount resource-ahead ]
    set heading 270
  if ( resource-ahead > best-amount )
    [ set best-direction 270
    set best-amount resource-ahead ]
    set heading best-direction
end
to-report resource-ahead
  let total 0
  let how-far 1
  repeat vision
  [ set total total + [ resource-here ] of patch-ahead how-far
    set how-far how-far + 1 ]
  report total
end
to grow-resource 
  if ( resource-here < max-resource-here )
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  [ set resource-here resource-here + num-resource-grown
  if ( resource-here > max-resource-here )
  [ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
  recolor-patch ]
end
to extract
  ask rationals [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
  [ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality ) ]
  [ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here / (count turtles-
here )) ]
  recolor-patch]
  ask rationals [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
  [ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - rationality )]
  [ set resource-here 0 ]
  recolor-patch]
  ask sustainables [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
  [ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality)];; - rationality * ( 
value / 100 ))) ]
  [ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here / (count turtles-
here)) ]
  recolor-patch]
  ask sustainables [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
  [ set resource-here floor ( resource-here -  rationality )];;- 
rationality * (value / 100 )))]
  [ set resource-here 0 ]
  recolor-patch]
  ask turtles [
    ifelse show-wealth?
    [ set label wealth ]
    [ set label “” ]]
end
to move-sustainables
    if (ceiling random-float 100.0) <= sustainables-move [fd 1 ]
    if sustainables-move = true [set wealth ( wealth - metabolism )]
end
Tanrikulu: Advancing Rationality with Sustainability
2017] 45advancinG raTionaliTy wiTh susTainabiliTy 
to move-rationals
    if (ceiling random-float 100.0) <= rationals-move [fd 1 ]
    if rationals-move = true [set wealth ( wealth - metabolism )]
end
D – The NetLogo Code for the Greed Model
globals [ resource max-resource min-resource initial-wealth ]
breed [ sustainables sustainable ] 
breed [ rationals rational ] 
turtles-own [ metabolism vision rationality wealth ]
patches-own [ resource-here max-resource-here ]
to setup
  ca






   ask patches
  [ set max-resource-here 0
    if ( random-float 100.0 ) <= percent-best-land
    [ set max-resource-here max-resource
      set resource-here max-resource-here ]]
  repeat 5
  [ ask patches with [ max-resource-here != 0 ]
    [ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
    diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
  repeat 10
  [ diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
  ask patches
  [ set resource-here floor resource-here
    set max-resource-here resource-here
    recolor-patch ]
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end
to recolor-patch 
  set pcolor scale-color green resource-here 0 max-resource
end
to setup-turtles
  create-sustainables initial-sustainables
  [
    move-to one-of patches
    set color 65
    set shape “person”
    set-initial-turtle-vars
    set rationality random 1 + 5 ]
  create-rationals initial-rationals
  [
    move-to one-of patches
    set color red
    set shape “person”
    set-initial-turtle-vars
    set rationality random 5 + 5 ]
end
to set-initial-turtle-vars
  face one-of neighbors4
  set metabolism 1 + random 7
  set wealth metabolism
  set vision 1 + random 7
end
to go
  ask sustainables
    [ turn-toward-resource-t ]
  ask rationals
    [ turn-toward-resource-r ]
  extract
  ask sustainables
    [ move-sustainables ]
  ask rationals
    [ move-rationals ]
  ask patches [ grow-resource ]
  if ticks mod resource-growth-interval = 0
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  set heading 0
  let best-direction 0
  let best-amount greed
  set heading 90
  if ( resource-ahead-r > best-amount )
    [ set best-direction 90
    set best-amount resource-ahead-r ]
    set heading 180
  if ( resource-ahead-r > best-amount )
    [ set best-direction 180
    set best-amount resource-ahead-r ]
    set heading 270
  if ( resource-ahead-r > best-amount )
    [ set best-direction 270
    set best-amount resource-ahead-r ]
    set heading best-direction
end
to-report resource-ahead-r
  let total 0
  let how-far 1
   repeat vision
  [ set total total + [ resource-here ] of patch-ahead how-far
    set how-far how-far + 1 ]
  report total
end
to turn-toward-resource-t
  set heading 0
  let best-direction 0
  let best-amount resource-here
  set heading 90
  if ( resource-here > best-amount )
    [ set best-direction 90
    set best-amount resource-ahead-t ]
    set heading 180
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  if ( resource-ahead-t > best-amount )
    [ set best-direction 180
    set best-amount resource-ahead-t ]
    set heading 270
  if ( resource-ahead-t > best-amount )
    [ set best-direction 270
    set best-amount resource-ahead-t ]
    set heading best-direction
end
to-report resource-ahead-t
  let total 0
  let how-far 1
   repeat vision
  [ set total total + [ resource-here ] of patch-ahead how-far
    set how-far how-far + 1 ]
  report total
end
to grow-resource 
  if ( resource-here < max-resource-here )
  [ set resource-here resource-here + num-resource-grown
  if ( resource-here > max-resource-here )
  [ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
  recolor-patch ]
end
to extract
  ask rationals [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
  [ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality ) ]
  [ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here / (count turtles-
here )) ]
  recolor-patch]
  ask rationals [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
  [ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - rationality )]
  [ set resource-here 0 ]
  recolor-patch]
  ask sustainables [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
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  [ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality)];; - rationality * ( 
value / 100 ))) ]
  [ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here / (count turtles-
here)) ]
  recolor-patch]
  ask sustainables [
  ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
  [ set resource-here floor ( resource-here -  rationality )];;- 
rationality * (value / 100 )))]
  [ set resource-here 0 ]
  recolor-patch]
  ask turtles [
    ifelse show-wealth?
    [ set label wealth ]
    [ set label “” ]]
end
to move-sustainables
    if (ceiling random-float 100.0) <= sustainables-move [fd 1 ]
    if sustainables-move = true [set wealth ( wealth - metabolism )]
end
to move-rationals
    if (ceiling random-float 100.0) <= rationals-move [fd 1]
    if rationals-move = true [set wealth ( wealth - metabolism )]
end
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appendix ii — Graphs
Tanrikulu: Advancing Rationality with Sustainability
2017] 51advancinG raTionaliTy wiTh susTainabiliTy 
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
52 [Vol. 2:1The haTfield GraduaTe Journal of Public affairs
Tanrikulu: Advancing Rationality with Sustainability
2017] 53advancinG raTionaliTy wiTh susTainabiliTy 
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
54 [Vol. 2:1The haTfield GraduaTe Journal of Public affairs
Tanrikulu: Advancing Rationality with Sustainability
2017] 55advancinG raTionaliTy wiTh susTainabiliTy 
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
